There are other resentments. Some in Ethiopia and Kenya are upset that Sudan and Uganda have used the IGAD banner to reach such an unstoppable agreement for national interests. Kenya also remains frustrated by Sudan`s refusal to relinquish the role of leading mediator. At a peace celebration in Juba on 31 October, attended by Bashir, Museveni and other regional heads of state, Kenyan officials were remarkably absent. On 4 February, the UN Security Council received an AU-approved request from IGAD to send nearly 1,700 troops under a UN mandate as part of the UNSAM Regional Protection Force. [fn] ”Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council of 4 February 2019,” UN Security Council document S/2019/110, published on 7 February 2019. In August 2016, after the July fighting in Juba, the UN Security Council approved an IGAD request to send an additional 4,000 troops to the Organization of the Regional Protection Force within UNAMAS. Resolution 2304 (2016),” LEC S/RES/2304/2016, 12 August 2016. The Regional Protection Force is widely recognized as a failure, in part because of Juba`s opposition to its mandate. The first group of peacekeepers arrived in the country in August 2017, after eleven months of delay. It consisted of Rwandan and Ethiopian troops, accompanied by a Nepalese company and more than 100 Bangladeshi engineers.
”Press conference on the arrival of regional protection forces in Juba, South Sudan,” UNMISS Media Relations and Spokesperson Unit, August 8, 2017. These troops remain miles outside the city and cannot fulfill their mandate to protect the airport and other ”key facilities” in Juba. Several UN officials have called the operation a ”gimmick,” meaning political cover for the Security Council and regional inaction in the spread of violence after the July 2016 collapse. Others, who participated in the mandate negotiations, say that U.S. officials, in particular, have implicitly pushed the force as a mechanism for evacuating personnel in the event of further violence. Hence their mission to protect Juba`s ”means of intrusion and exit.” Resolution 2327 (2016), UNSC S/RES/2327/2016, 16 December 2016. The main outcome of this episode was the inability of the Security Council to enforce a UNMISS mandate, rejected by Juba. [fn] Mr. Guterres was not required to face the proposal. He said the UN was ready to submit an assessment of the necessary adjustments, but only after Juba`s security measures were completed. ”Secretary-General`s Report on South Sudan (for the period December 1 to February 26, 2019),” UN Security Council document, S/2019/191, Published on 28 February 2019.The Council, which will renew the mandate of UNAMAS on 14 March, should seriously consider this proposal, but not point it out, which must provide a clear and direct solution to the most difficult part of the peace agreement, namely the safeguarding of Juba, in particular the protection of opposition leaders, as part of an interim security agreement that is to control the capital of the armed parties. If there is no alternative, the Council, in agreement with the region, should ask UNMISS to grant such VIP protection to Juba as the least offensive of all the bad options, in order to responsibly pave the way for a unity government.
South Sudan has made no progress in establishing the Hybrid Court under the 2015 peace agreement and integrated into the revitalized agreement. It has yet to sign the Memorandum of Understanding with the AU or legislate to establish the tribunal. What potentially differentiates the Juba Agreement is that Sudan`s civilian-led transitional government seeks to bring peace, justice and democracy to the goals of the revolution; That the agreement was negotiated between the Sudanese themselves, in the light of South Sudanese mediation and weak logistical and technical support from the international community; and that much of the negotiations took place between former comrades, in stark contrast to the conflicting atmosphere that prevailed during the